The Supreme Court dismissed appeals by Stephen Cormack and Keith Farrell seeking to prohibit summary prosecutions after delays in executing bench warrants. In a judgment delivered by Mr Justice Kearns on 2 December 2008, the court confirmed the High Court orders refusing relief, leaving both prosecutions free to proceed.
The court said Gardaí must execute bench warrants promptly or within a reasonable time. A failure may amount to blameworthy prosecutorial delay, and warrants should not simply be left inactive. But delay does not automatically stop a prosecution: courts must balance the reasons for delay, the conduct of the accused, prejudice and the public interest. That balance applies to summary cases too, although shorter delays may become intolerable in such cases.
Cormack faced charges arising from an alleged incident at Blanchardstown Shopping Centre on 28 July 2002: intoxication in a public place and possession of a lump hammer, which the prosecution alleged he had for the purpose of causing injury or incapacitating someone. He also faced a separate theft charge concerning an alleged teddy bear theft in February 2003. Bench warrants issued after he failed to attend court dates. The Supreme Court found Garda inaction contributed to delay, particularly between April 2004 and April 2005, but considered Cormack more responsible overall, including because he had missed an earlier trial date. It found no specific defence prejudice or heightened stress and anxiety sufficient to justify prohibition. The public interest in prosecuting the charges, including the hammer allegation the court described as serious, outweighed the delay.
Farrell’s case concerned five summonses for alleged road traffic offences in July 2004. He had given an out-of-date address, and the summonses were posted there. After a bench warrant issued when he did not attend court, Gardaí made one call to the address where he had been staying, but did not make further efforts. The Supreme Court held that more should have been done, including responding to a letter from Farrell’s solicitor and using later court appearances as opportunities to confirm his identity. It also said the High Court judge had set too high a threshold by suggesting stress and anxiety had to cause illness.
However, Farrell did not claim actual prejudice to his defence, and the court found the psychologist’s report added no valuable evidence beyond his reported complaints. It also considered Farrell partly responsible for delay because of the address he gave and his failure to follow up after being told of the warrant. The court concluded there had been delay, but not gross delay, and dismissed his appeal.