The Supreme Court has dismissed John Colm Murphy’s appeal over the refusal to extend time for him to challenge a 1999 professional misconduct finding. It accepted that his proposed appeal met the high threshold of arguability required after such a lengthy delay, but concluded that the balance of justice still weighed against extending time.
The case concerns a Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal finding that Murphy, a solicitor, was guilty of misconduct for failing to file an accountant’s report for his Killarney practice for the year ending 31 March 1997. He had taken over the practice from Tim Healy on 16 August 1996. Murphy’s position was that he was not responsible for the accounts covering the earlier “missing months”, when Healy was still in charge.
The tribunal censured Murphy and ordered him to pay the Law Society of Ireland’s costs. He did not appeal within the statutory 21-day period. In 2020, after a High Court hearing in separate proceedings brought by Murphy, he sought an extension of time to appeal. He relied in part on a 1997 letter from the Law Society to Healy stating that Healy was responsible for filing accounts for the missing months. Murphy argued that the letter had not been disclosed to him or the tribunal and would have supported his defence.
The High Court refused the extension in 2021, and the Court of Appeal dismissed Murphy’s appeal later that year. The Supreme Court considered the case on the assumption that it had jurisdiction to extend time, referring to a similar statutory provision addressed in its decision in Kirwan v O’Leary. It held that the flexible principles governing extensions of time in other appeals were suitable for disciplinary appeals too.
Justice Woulfe said the proposed appeal met the demanding arguability threshold. The misconduct allegation referred to the full year, although Murphy had taken over the practice partway through it; the Law Society’s former Registrar had later accepted in evidence that the allegation should have referred to the eight months ending 31 March 1997. That evidence made it difficult for the Society to rely on an argument that the charge was simply about failing to file any report.
But the Supreme Court found no good reason for Murphy’s failure to appeal in 1999. The Court said he could have raised at the tribunal hearing the argument that he could not account for months before taking over the practice, whether or not he knew about the Healy letter. It rejected the suggestion that the Law Society’s position at the time justified not appealing. Although prejudice to a regulatory body can be relevant, the Court said a serious risk of prejudice had not been demonstrated on these facts.
The Court dismissed the appeal. The refusal to extend time therefore stands, and the 1999 tribunal decision remains unappealed.