The Supreme Court allowed the Equality Authority’s appeal over Portmarnock Golf Club’s status under the Equal Status Act 2000, ruling that the club did not qualify for the Act’s exemption for certain single-gender clubs.
The judgment, delivered by Mr Justice Fennelly on 3 November 2009, addressed only the interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions. The Court said Portmarnock’s principal purpose was playing golf and that, although membership was restricted to men, the club also catered for women golfers. It therefore did not meet the requirement that its principal purpose be to cater only for the needs of people in a particular category.
The Equality Authority had applied to the District Court for a determination that Portmarnock was a “discriminating club” under section 8 of the Act. The District Court found that it was and, in May 2004, ordered the club’s registration certificate suspended for seven days. The club’s registration allowed it to supply intoxicating liquor to members.
The club appealed through a case stated to the High Court and brought separate proceedings challenging the legislation. The High Court ruled that Portmarnock was not a discriminating club, concluding that its principal purpose was to cater for the needs of male golfers. It also rejected the club’s constitutional challenge. The Equality Authority appealed the statutory interpretation ruling, while the club appealed the dismissal of its constitutional claim.
The Supreme Court judgment said the District Court’s factual finding that the club’s principal purpose was playing golf was binding for the case stated. It noted that women could play the course on the same terms as male non-members, had changing and locker facilities, and had access to clubhouse facilities apart from male locker rooms. The judgment considered the club’s provision for women inconsistent with catering “only” for male golfers’ needs.
The Court answered the case stated by holding that the District Court was correct to declare Portmarnock a discriminating club. The judgment dealt solely with statutory interpretation. It said the constitutional questions did not arise in light of the Court’s decision; it did not determine the club’s constitutional appeal. The judgment’s order was the appellate answer to the case stated, rather than a new order suspending the registration certificate.