A woman identified as R.C. is entitled to compensation after the High Court found she contracted HIV while living with her partner in Lucan and qualified as his “spouse” under the Hepatitis C Compensation Act 1997.
Ms Justice Irvine delivered the judgment on 30 March 2012 following a full de novo hearing of R.C.’s appeal. The Hepatitis C and HIV Compensation Tribunal had rejected her application in March 2011, finding she did not meet the Act’s definition of spouse.
R.C. was diagnosed HIV-positive in 2009. Her partner, A.F., had contracted HIV and hepatitis C from contaminated blood products used to treat his haemophilia, and the respondent accepted that he passed HIV to her. The dispute was whether R.C. and A.F. were cohabiting at the material time, which would bring her within the Act’s definition of spouse.
The judge found the couple began a relationship in 2003 and moved into an apartment A.F. bought in Lucan before Christmas that year. They lived there together for about six months in a loving and committed relationship, shared household arrangements and socialised as a couple, the court found. They later returned to live with their respective parents but remained together until the relationship ended in 2006.
The respondent argued that moving into the apartment did not show the level of commitment required for cohabitation, and that the couple’s later separation of homes supported that position. The judge rejected that account, finding the evidence showed a committed relationship and that A.F.’s health and need for care were relevant to his return to his mother’s home.
Medical evidence placed R.C.’s likely infection between June 2003 and September 2004, with infection more likely during the first eight or nine months of 2004. The judge concluded, on the balance of probabilities, that R.C. was infected while they were living together in Lucan.
The court held that the 1997 Act sets no minimum period of cohabitation for this compensation claim. It found that R.C. and A.F. were cohabiting in an intimate and committed relationship at the time of infection, and that she was entitled to compensation under section 4(1)(g). The judgment determined entitlement; it does not state a compensation amount.