The High Court ruled that a Garda need not personally witness a person driving before forming an opinion that can ground an arrest for a Road Traffic Act offence. The judgment concerned a prosecutor’s appeal by way of case stated, and addressed the legal approach taken by the District Court judge who dismissed the prosecution.
The charge alleged that Anthony Reddy drove on the N4 Lucan Bypass in County Dublin on 13 May 2009 while over the statutory alcohol limit. The District Court heard that off-duty Garda Orlaith Keogh saw a car weaving between lanes, cross two lanes near roadworks and strike traffic cones before crashing onto the hard shoulder. She called emergency services but left before the responding officers arrived, and said she had not identified the driver or given the car’s registration number.
Garda Mark Grant testified that he responded to a control-room call about an Audi A4 that had been driven erratically and crashed. He found Reddy alone in the damaged car. Grant described slurred speech, glazed eyes and a strong smell of alcohol. After cautioning him, Grant said, Reddy admitted driving and having had a few drinks. A breath test later recorded 66 micrograms of alcohol per 100 millilitres of breath.
At the close of the prosecution case, the District Judge dismissed the drink-driving charge. He accepted the defence argument that Grant could not reasonably form the required opinion because he had not seen Reddy driving, Keogh had not identified him as the driver, and Grant could not explain how he received the vehicle’s registration number. The judge also declined the prosecution’s request to consider an alternative conviction under section 50, finding “too many gaps in the prosecution case”.
The High Court considered the first question under the case-stated procedure, which is confined to points of law. It held that requiring the arresting Garda to have witnessed the driving would add a condition not found in section 49(8). The opinion could be based on the Garda’s own observations or information from others, and could rest on limited information, provided it was formed bona fide and not capriciously or without proper grounds.
The court concluded that the District Judge had applied the wrong legal approach by treating Grant’s own observations as the only permissible basis for the opinion. It answered the first question in the negative, meaning the judge was not correct in law to dismiss the case on that basis. The court said that answer also disposed of the second question concerning section 50. The judgment did not itself determine Reddy’s guilt or impose a conviction or sentence.