The Court of Appeal allowed the Director of Public Prosecutions’ appeal after a trial judge directed a jury to acquit D. P. of dangerous driving causing death. The court held that the charge should have been left to the jury. Its judgment did not convict D. P. or order a retrial.
D. P. had pleaded not guilty to the single charge. At the close of the prosecution case, the trial judge directed the jury to return a not-guilty verdict. The DPP appealed under section 23 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2010, which allows an appeal where a directed acquittal was wrong in law and the evidence could reasonably support guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecution evidence concerned a collision on the N20 near Charleville on 23 July 2014. A Peugeot driven by D. P. crossed onto the wrong side of the road and collided with a Mazda travelling in the opposite direction. The Mazda’s 22-year-old driver died at the scene. The court recounted eyewitness evidence that the road was straight at the collision site, visibility was clear, and the Peugeot veered across the road after a lorry had passed. A collision investigator said the Peugeot’s first gouge mark was 1.7 metres over the broken white line. There was no evidence of a vehicle defect, phone use at the time, or alcohol detected in the aftermath.
The trial judge said he considered careless driving causing death more appropriate and was concerned jurors might focus on the fatal consequences rather than assess the driving. The DPP argued that the judge had applied the wrong test: whether the prosecution evidence, taken at its highest, could support a conviction by a properly instructed jury. D. P. argued that the judge had carefully assessed a borderline case and was entitled to withdraw it.
The Court of Appeal said dangerous driving is assessed by whether a reasonably prudent person, in all the circumstances, would recognise a direct, immediate and serious risk to the public. The prosecution did not have to prove that D. P. intended to drive dangerously; it was enough that he intended to drive while the alleged dangerous conduct occurred.
The court said the evidence could support an inference that D. P. became distracted or momentarily inattentive and drifted onto the wrong side. Whether that amounted to dangerous driving was an issue for the jury. The N20 was a national primary route, and an oncoming car was present. The trial judge had focused on the preferred charge and the risk of jurors being swayed by the outcome instead of asking whether the evidence could support a conviction. The court said careful jury instructions could address the latter concern.
The court allowed the appeal. It expressed no view on whether a careless-driving-causing-death charge could have been left to the jury as an alternative, and made no retrial order in the judgment.