The Court of Appeal dismissed Patrick O’Connor’s appeals against orders striking out two sets of proceedings concerning property and secured borrowing in Cork. It also upheld an order restricting further litigation connected with those matters, while clarifying that the restriction was not a blanket ban.
The appeals concerned proceedings against the purchasers of a house at 16 Amberley Heights, Douglas, and their solicitor, and a separate claim against the Property Registration Authority of Ireland (PRAI). O’Connor sought the return of Amberley and damages over the registration of charges and mortgages on several properties. His claims challenged the title and security interests held by Feniton Property Finance DAC, which had acquired the loans and securities from Bank of Scotland plc (BOS).
In October 2017, the High Court struck out both cases as an abuse of process, finding they sought to relitigate matters already decided in four earlier sets of proceedings. It also made an Isaac Wunder order restricting O’Connor from bringing further proceedings, directly or indirectly, concerning the properties and borrowings involved.
In a judgment delivered by Ms Justice Baker, the Court of Appeal said the claims against the Amberley purchasers and their solicitor depended in substance on challenging Feniton’s title to the security. O’Connor could have raised that challenge in earlier proceedings, including proceedings begun in 2016, after he knew Feniton had acquired the loans and securities. The court held that the rule in Henderson v Henderson barred him from raising those matters later.
The court also rejected O’Connor’s argument that the debt had been extinguished by the earlier money judgment and could not be assigned to Feniton. It said a judgment debt could be assigned and that the judgment did not mean the debt ceased to exist for enforcement purposes. The court considered other arguments, including alleged tax and professional misconduct, and found no basis to disturb the High Court’s decision.
The Court of Appeal upheld the Isaac Wunder order, describing it as justified by the history of litigation. It stressed that the order was limited: it did not prevent litigation on unrelated matters, nor absolutely prohibit cases concerning the Cork properties and loans. A suitable case could proceed with court authorisation. The appeals were dismissed.