The High Court set aside an order renewing a summons in a dispute over alleged defects in a house at Tara Hill, Gorey, County Wexford. Mr Justice Clarke ruled on 21 January 2010 that the plaintiffs had not shown a good reason for the delay and that the balance of justice would not favour renewal.
The plaintiffs, Edmond and Jacqueline Moloney, had engaged Meehan Levins Partnership to design the dwelling and Lacey Building and Civil Engineering Limited to build it. They ended their retainers in February 2002, citing alleged construction defects and concerns about the contractor’s workmanship and the architects’ supervision and certificates. Those were complaints described in the judgment, not findings that the defendants were liable.
The plenary summons was issued on 9 January 2004 but was not served within the prescribed period. In May 2009, Peart J. renewed it for six months on an application made without notice to the defendants. The second, third and fourth named defendants—the architects—then applied to set that renewal aside. The court’s decision concerned that application; it did not determine the underlying allegations about the house.
The plaintiffs’ solicitor said service had been delayed while awaiting expert material and because the plaintiffs intended to serve a statement of claim with the summons. Justice Clarke found that the plaintiffs already had sufficient expert material to justify starting professional-negligence proceedings. The later report, issued in 2006, said the house might have to be demolished to rectify identified problems. The judge held that the need for more detail to prepare a statement of claim did not justify leaving the summons unserved.
The judge also rejected the argument that the architects had meaningful notice that proceedings had actually begun. A January 2006 letter referred to High Court proceedings, but the architects’ solicitors replied that proceedings were intended and offered to accept service. Correspondence then fell silent until after the limitation period was likely to have expired in February 2008. The judge said the architects could reasonably have thought the matter had been dropped.
Justice Clarke found a real risk of prejudice from the passage of time, particularly because detailed claims might distinguish defects attributable to construction from those attributable to design or supervision. He noted that the possibility of demolishing and rebuilding the house had emerged only recently and could require detailed analysis. He also took account of the lengthy delay, including the period after the likely limitation deadline, and proceedings the plaintiffs had brought against their former solicitors for alleged negligence.
The court concluded there was no good reason to renew the summons and, independently, that the balance of justice weighed against renewal. It ordered that Peart J.’s renewal order be set aside. The judgment did not decide the merits of the house-defects claims.