The High Court has granted Garda member Tom Molloy relief in a judicial review over delays in a disciplinary complaint, finding that the delay was “so inordinate and inexcusable” that it violated his basic rights to natural and constitutional justice.
Mr Molloy sought an order preventing the Garda Síochána Complaints Tribunal from holding a full hearing on the complaint, or an injunction instead. He also sought a declaration that the failure to process the complaint expeditiously breached his rights, statutory duties or legitimate expectations.
A member of the public complained on 21 April 2004 that Mr Molloy had not told her the outcome of an investigation into an alleged forged letter and had not replied to related correspondence. The complaint was initially ruled inadmissible as out of time, but the Garda Síochána Complaints Board upheld the complainant’s appeal and deemed it admissible.
The complaint was investigated and referred to the Tribunal in March 2005. The documents provided to Mr Molloy set out three alleged disciplinary breaches, which he denied through his solicitor. A full hearing was scheduled and postponed repeatedly. The court described almost three years of delay and four postponements after the matter was before the Tribunal. Reasons for postponement included the unavailability of the complainant’s solicitor, Mr Molloy’s requested postponement, the Tribunal chairperson and the investigating officer. The judgment records a dispute about the basis for one postponement.
Mr Molloy argued that the Tribunal had failed to act with reasonable expedition and that he had been available for all but a few short weeks. The Tribunal said the delay did not justify stopping it from carrying out its statutory role, and argued that Mr Molloy had identified no prejudice to his ability to receive a fair hearing. It also submitted that prohibition would be disproportionate and would frustrate the public interest in investigating complaints against Garda members.
The court recognised the public interest in fully investigating complaints, alongside the need to deal with them promptly. It said the 1986 Act contains no strict overall time limit for holding a hearing, but requires a minimum degree of expedition. Responsibility for keeping the process moving rested primarily with the Tribunal, the judge said; scheduling difficulties did not excuse periods of complete inaction.
The judgment concludes that the delay violated Mr Molloy’s rights and states: “I will therefore grant the relief sought.” It does not set out, in the supplied text, the specific form of the final order or separately state that the complaint itself was dismissed.