The High Court allowed a company’s appeal against a Circuit Court refusal to dismiss a claim over injuries allegedly caused by a defective ladder. The court found that the plaintiff’s delay in prosecuting the case was inordinate and inexcusable, and that the balance of justice favoured dismissal.
The judgment, delivered by Mr Justice MacGrath on 31 July 2018, concerned an appeal from an order made on 21 November 2017. The Circuit Court had refused the company’s application to dismiss the claim for want of prosecution and to extend the time for delivery of a statement of claim by seven days. The High Court allowed the appeal. The judgment does not set out a separate operative order expressly dismissing the claim.
Paddy Gallagher’s claim arose from an accident on 19 August 2003. He alleged that he fell while using a ladder he had bought from the defendant, P.W. Shaw & Company Limited, because it was defective. The claim was first brought in the High Court and later remitted to the Circuit Court. The company’s solicitors had raised concerns early on that the defendant was incorrectly named in the original summons. An order to amend the name was made in July 2006, but the High Court said it was unclear whether an amended summons was formally issued and served.
The company sought dismissal, pointing to long periods with no procedural steps, the absence of proceedings against the ladder’s potential suppliers or manufacturers, and possible prejudice to its ability to join them. Gallagher argued that the defendant’s conduct and the correspondence explained the delay, that the company had been aware of the claim, and that inspections and medical examinations had taken place. These were the parties’ submissions; the court assessed them against the record and applicable delay principles.
The judge accepted that confusion over responsibility for the ladder and the defendant’s correct name explained the early delay, at least until shortly before the limitation period expired in July 2006. But later periods of inactivity—including years after the case was remitted to the Circuit Court—were not adequately explained. The court rejected the allegation that the defendant’s solicitors had “ghosted” the case or acted in bad faith, and found no basis to treat their inactivity as acquiescence in the plaintiff’s delay.
In weighing the balance of justice, the judge said the delay likely deprived the company of a realistic opportunity to consider joining potential third parties. He also referred to the claim, made in the statement of claim delivered after the Circuit Court hearing, that the company was a producer under the Liability for Defective Products Act 1991. The judgment does not determine whether the ladder was defective or whether the company was liable for the accident.