The High Court has refused an applicant permission to appeal a prior refusal of leave to seek judicial review over whether the Minister for Justice and Equality could make a deportation order when the applicant had not provided an address for service.
Mr Justice Richard Humphreys delivered the ex tempore judgment on 20 March 2017. The application concerned one of two proposed appeal questions. Leave to appeal on the other question had already been refused in a separate judgment.
The applicant argued that section 6(1) of the Immigration Act 1999, as amended, prevented the Minister from proceeding without serving notice at an address. His counsel submitted that the court’s interpretation effectively amended the legislation and that requiring public bodies to comply with statutory duties raised a point of exceptional public importance.
The judge rejected that submission. He said the earlier judicial review application had been refused on four independent grounds: that placing notice on file could meet the statutory requirement where no address had been furnished; that a different interpretation would produce an unworkable result; that the applicant had waived statutory rights through his conduct; and that his conduct justified refusing relief as a matter of discretion.
The judge said the applicant had left direct-provision accommodation at Balseskin, had no contact with it, and had not provided another address. Serving notice at Balseskin, as the applicant’s counsel proposed, would therefore have been an empty formality, he said. He also held that the cited authorities did not establish an exceptional point of public importance in the circumstances.
The court separately found that an appeal by this applicant would not be in the public interest. It said the situation arose from the applicant’s failure to provide an address and comply with obligations associated with his presence in the State. The judge stressed that the decision did not displace the general position that notice must be served personally or at the last notified address under section 6; he described the case as exceptional.
The order was limited to refusing leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. The judgment did not make a deportation order. It addressed whether an appeal could proceed from the earlier refusal of judicial review leave.