The Supreme Court has dismissed D.T.’s appeal seeking to stop a criminal trial on charges arising from complaints by P.K., finding that D.T. had not shown a real or serious risk of an unfair trial caused by delay. The court said any question about D.T.’s fitness to stand trial was for the trial court to decide through the appropriate procedures.
The judgment, delivered by Denham J. on 25 January 2007, also dismissed the Director of Public Prosecutions’ cross-appeal. As a result, the High Court’s prohibition on trial in relation to complaints by C.K. remains in place. The prohibition concerning M.W. also remains: that issue was not before the Supreme Court on appeal.
The charges arose from alleged offences said to have occurred between 1976 and 1980. They included alleged buggery and indecent assault against P.K., four alleged indecent assaults against C.K., P.K.’s brother, and two alleged indecent assaults against M.W. The judgment records that complaints were made to gardaí in October 2000. These were allegations; the Supreme Court appeal concerned whether the trial could proceed, not whether the charges were proved.
The High Court had refused to prohibit the trial on the P.K. complaints, but prohibited trial on the complaints involving C.K. and M.W. D.T. appealed the decision concerning P.K.; the Director appealed the prohibition concerning C.K.
The Supreme Court applied the test stated in an earlier decision, H. v. The Director of Public Prosecutions: whether delay created a real or serious risk that the accused would not receive a fair trial. It said courts no longer needed to establish why complainants had delayed making complaints in cases of this kind.
D.T.’s appeal submissions relied on medical evidence, including alleged cognitive impairment following a 1983 road traffic accident. Denham J. held that capacity or disability was not prejudice caused by delay and was outside this judicial review. The judgment made no finding on the procedures under the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006. It said an appropriate application could still be made to the trial judge.
The court concluded that D.T. had not established the required delay-related risk of an unfair trial. It dismissed the appeal and affirmed the High Court decision allowing the trial on the P.K. complaints to proceed without an injunction. The cross-appeal was also dismissed, leaving the C.K. prohibition undisturbed.