The High Court has refused Louis Blehein's attempt to revive proceedings begun in 1995 over three periods of involuntary detention at St. John of God Hospital in Stillorgan.
Ms Justice Laffoy ruled on March 16, 2009 that the delay in seeking to re-enter the case was both inordinate and inexcusable and that the balance of justice favoured refusing the application.
Blehein's original proceedings challenged the constitutionality of sections 185 and 186 of the Mental Treatment Act 1945 and sought damages arising from periods of detention in 1984, 1987 and 1991. The State defendants denied the constitutional claim and also pleaded that the damages action was statute-barred.
The case was set down for trial in 1996 but was later struck out on March 18, 1999 after neither side appeared when uncertified cases were called over. Blehein indicated in November 2000 that he wished to discontinue the case, but withdrew that position days later. He did not apply to restore the proceedings until July 2005.
Blehein argued that section 260 of the 1945 Act had effectively prevented him from pursuing the proceedings until its constitutionality was successfully challenged in separate litigation. Section 260 restricted the institution of certain civil proceedings arising from acts purportedly done under the Act unless High Court permission was obtained.
Ms Justice Laffoy rejected that argument. She held that Blehein's constitutional challenge to sections 185 and 186 did not fall within section 260 and that the provision had not prevented him from prosecuting the case.
Applying principles normally used when deciding whether proceedings should be dismissed for delay, the judge noted that more than six years had elapsed between the case being struck out and the 2005 restoration application. The underlying detentions were also already between 14 and 21 years old by then.
The court additionally considered the multiplicity of related proceedings, the age of the events, the repeal of the challenged provisions and the fact that separate 2002 proceedings had already been returned to the High Court for assessment of damages.
The motion to re-enter the 1995 proceedings was therefore dismissed.