The Supreme Court has dismissed an appeal by the Director of Public Prosecutions over a decision to quash the return for trial of an anonymised accused on a charge arising from an alleged sexual assault on a child in England.
The judgment, delivered by Mr Justice Geoghegan on 6 February 2003, upheld the High Court’s order. The Supreme Court held that section 2 of the Sexual Offences (Jurisdiction) Act 1996 extends Irish jurisdiction to certain existing offences; it does not create a separate offence.
The charge stated that B.H., described as ordinarily resident in the State, had sexually assaulted a child at a hotel in Wigan, Greater Manchester, on or about 1 June 1997. It said the alleged act constituted an offence under English and Welsh law and cited section 2 of the 1996 Act. The judgment recounts that the accused was brought before Kilmainham District Court following Garda investigations and a warrant, and that a book of evidence was served on 2 September 1999.
The DPP argued that the charge disclosed no offence known to law because the 1996 Act did not itself create one. The High Court accepted that argument and quashed the District Court judge’s order returning the accused for trial in the Dublin Circuit Criminal Court. The Supreme Court agreed that the charge did not specify which offence in the 1996 Act’s Schedule was alleged.
The judgment said the wording “sexually assault” did not resolve the problem: it described the alleged conduct in England but did not identify a particular Irish statutory offence. The court noted that the possible offences carried very different maximum penalties, from five years for sexual assault to life imprisonment for aggravated sexual assault. It also rejected the DPP’s fallback submission that the charge gave sufficient information despite failing to specify the scheduled offence.
The court said, in obiter, that a properly drafted charge should identify the particular scheduled Irish offence, cite its statutory provision and refer to section 2 of the 1996 Act to show that the incident occurred abroad. It further held that, because the return for trial carried forward the wording of the charge, an invalid charge made the return invalid. The accused was therefore not properly before the Circuit Court, and the DPP’s appeal was dismissed.
The judgment concerns the validity of the charge and return for trial. It does not determine whether the alleged conduct occurred.