The High Court ordered the release of a respondent sought for extradition to Jersey, finding that the request had not been communicated in the manner required by the Extradition Act 1965.
The respondent, identified in the redacted judgment as M. P. Q., was wanted in Jersey to face a charge of rape allegedly committed in 2004. The judgment says the alleged victim had been in a consensual relationship with him, which she is alleged to have ended about 36 hours before the alleged offence. The allegation was not determined in these extradition proceedings.
The Attorney General applied under Part II of the Act. The respondent was arrested in County Cork on 3 July 2006 and brought before the High Court. His objections concerned how the request was transmitted, whether supporting affidavits were properly sworn, whether a Jersey arrest warrant from December 2004 remained enforceable, and whether delay had prejudiced him.
Justice Michael Peart upheld the objection to the transmission of the request. Section 23 required communication by a diplomatic agent or another means provided for by the relevant extradition provisions. The request was sent by the British Embassy, but the documents did not identify or bear the signature of an ambassador or another person falling within the statutory definition of diplomatic agent. The court held that the documents themselves rebutted the statutory presumption that the request had been duly made and received.
The court rejected the other three objections. It found that the supporting documents, bound together and bearing the seal of Jersey’s Attorney General, met the statutory requirements for admission without further proof. It also accepted that the Jersey warrant could be presumed lawful and still enforceable, as the respondent had produced no evidence to the contrary.
On delay, the court noted a 12-month interval between a request for further information and its receipt in May 2006. It said the interval could perhaps have been shorter, but found no evidence of real prejudice or a real risk that a trial would be unfair. The respondent’s anxiety and belief that the case would not proceed were not sufficient prejudice in the circumstances.
Because the request had not been duly made for the purposes of section 29, the court ordered the respondent’s release. It did not decide the rape allegation or make an order for extradition.