The Supreme Court judge who disclosed a shareholding in proceedings involving Goode Concrete did not convey the full extent of the shareholding he ultimately held, according to additional observations by Justice John MacMenamin in a 2015 appeal judgment.
Justice MacMenamin said he agreed with the judgment and order proposed by the Chief Justice. He stressed that the judgments should not be seen as reflecting on the integrity of the judge in question, who had served in national and European Union courts. The judge had disclosed a shareholding at the outset, he said, but the initial statements did not convey its eventual extent. Justice MacMenamin also said the judge did not objectively stand to gain from the outcome of the matters.
The appeal involved Goode Concrete and defendants CRH plc, Roadstone Wood Limited and Kilsaran Concrete. Justice MacMenamin said that, even where there might be doubts about the bona fides of an application to set aside a judgment, maintaining public confidence in the judiciary was fundamental. “For justice to be seen to be done,” he wrote, “the orders made should be set aside.”
His remarks were additional observations in the Supreme Court appeal, not a separate account of the full reasoning or operative terms of the court’s order. The source identifies the proposed judgment and order but does not specify which orders were set aside or describe their practical effect.
Justice MacMenamin said applications to set aside judgments for objective bias would generally be appropriate for the High Court, where factual issues could be tried and evidence assessed. He identified waiver, estoppel, acquiescence, abuse of process and the parties’ conduct as matters that could require factual examination. He noted that parties generally have a right of appeal, adding that this was not how the case had evolved.
For future cases, he said courts could consider the nature of the decision challenged, the de minimis principle, the time elapsed since judgment, and the evidence supporting or undermining the bona fides of an application. He reserved for future consideration how those principles should apply in individual cases. He also cautioned that applications for recusal should not be made lightly or without clear grounds.