The Supreme Court dismissed John Paul Brennan’s appeal against an order surrendering him to the United Kingdom, rejecting his claim that he could face a mandatory minimum sentence if convicted of escaping from lawful custody.
The appeal concerned only the UK’s request to prosecute him for the escape offence. A separate part of the European Arrest Warrant sought his return to serve the balance of sentences imposed after his 2002 convictions for robbery and failing to appear in court. The challenge to surrender for those sentences was not before the Court on this appeal.
The High Court had ordered surrender under section 16(1) of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003. Brennan argued that wording in the warrant about a minimum “tariff” for life prisoners suggested that a mandatory minimum period might apply if he were convicted of escape. He said this could breach his constitutional rights and argued that the High Court should have sought clarification from the UK issuing authority under section 20.
The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform opposed the appeal. The Minister submitted that the warrant said the sentence for escape was not prescribed and was at the sentencing judge’s discretion. The “tariff” passage, the Minister argued, concerned the review and release arrangements for people actually sentenced to life imprisonment.
Delivering the judgment on 4 May 2007, Chief Justice Murray said there was no evidence supporting the claim that a mandatory minimum sentence would apply. Read in context, the warrant’s tariff passage described parole or clemency arrangements for life sentences; it did not establish a statutory minimum for the escape offence. Any sentence imposed following conviction would remain within the sentencing court’s discretion.
The Court held that the High Court judge was entitled to decide not to seek further information. It dismissed the appeal, leaving the surrender order in place. The judgment did not decide whether mandatory minimum sentencing could, in other circumstances, be constitutionally restricted. Nor did it hold that surrender must be refused whenever the requesting country’s trial or sentencing procedures differ from Ireland’s. It said surrender could be refused where established circumstances showed that it would deny fundamental or human rights, including in an egregious case involving a fundamental defect in the requesting state’s justice system.