The Supreme Court has clarified how far Irish courts can go when making orders restricting a person from bringing vexatious or abusive litigation.
In a judgment delivered on 23 January 2026 in proceedings between G.M. and I.M., Mr Justice Brian Murray addressed two questions concerning so-called Isaac Wunder orders, which require a litigant to obtain court permission before starting further proceedings.
He held that the District Court and Circuit Court each have an inherent power to protect their own processes from abuse. Because there is one District Court and one Circuit Court nationally, an order made by a judge of either court in a case properly before it is not necessarily confined to the geographical district or circuit in which it was made.
Such an order operates personally against the litigant. It can therefore prevent that person from bringing proceedings covered by the order anywhere within the same court system, provided the original court had properly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Mr Justice Murray distinguished that power from a broader jurisdiction to make free-standing orders against litigation generally. He said he could identify no basis for the District or Circuit Courts to entertain a separate application restraining someone from litigating against the world at large.
The judgment also confirmed that the High Court can, in an appropriate case, restrain a litigant from bringing further abusive proceedings against a particular defendant in the District or Circuit Courts. That power derives from the High Court's long-recognised inherent jurisdiction to protect defendants from vexatious litigation, rather than from any general supervisory or protective authority over lower courts.
Mr Justice Murray stressed that lower courts remain independent in controlling their own procedures. The High Court's supervisory jurisdiction concerns correcting legal errors, not directing how those courts generally conduct their business.
He agreed generally with Ms Justice Dunne's judgment in the appeal, while addressing these jurisdictional issues separately because of their wider significance.