The High Court has prohibited the prosecution of M.U. on three groups of indecent-assault complaints brought by his sisters, finding that the passage of time had caused specific prejudice to his defence and that the proceedings risked being unfair.
In a judgment delivered on 28 April 2010, Mr Justice John MacMenamin said the allegations concerned events said to have occurred between 1965 and 1974, when M.U. was aged between 11 and 20. The complainants reported the allegations to gardaí in 2007. M.U. denied them and maintained his innocence.
The court considered M.U.’s application for judicial review seeking to stop the prosecution. It was not deciding whether the alleged offences happened. The judge said the court must presume M.U.’s innocence and should not make assumptions about the truth of the allegations for the purpose of the application.
The judgment identified several forms of specific prejudice, including the death of a garda whom M.U. said he had told about alleged abuse of his sisters, and the lack of a record of that complaint. The judge also relied on unavailable evidence about where M.U. lived, including evidence that his deceased cycling coach could have supported his account that he had left the family home around 1970; missing medical records relating to a condition and surgery; and the removal of a garden shed that featured in accounts of alleged assaults. The judge said disputed accounts about the shed could have affected the credibility of at least two complainants.
The court rejected some claimed sources of prejudice. It was not persuaded that the death of M.U.’s mother or younger brother had been shown to deprive him of relevant evidence capable of assisting his defence.
Separately, the judge found that evidence of financial pressure by the second complainant, N.V., amounted at minimum to blackmail or extreme financial pressure. N.V. admitted asking M.U. for money and help with debts and rent, but denied threatening to expose him or making allegations to extort money. The judge held that this exceptional circumstance would itself justify prohibiting the complaints relating to N.V.
The court concluded that the identified prejudice, considered individually and cumulatively, warranted prohibition in relation to all three complainants. It granted judicial review by way of prohibition, ending the prosecution on those complaint groups. The judgment did not determine the truth of the allegations.