The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by Moro Issak, otherwise known as Michael Chapwanya, and held that a second Personal Injuries Assessment Board (PIAB) authorisation was invalid insofar as it allowed proceedings against Noel Recruitment (Ireland) Limited (NR) for the same alleged workplace injury.
The judgment, delivered by Mr Justice Michael Peart on 4 May 2016, concerned an injury the notice party said he sustained on 23 October 2009 while lifting a sack of potatoes at a Keelings warehouse in Ballymun, Dublin. He first applied to PIAB for an assessment in August 2010, using the name Michael Chapwanya and naming NR and Keelings Ltd as respondents.
NR did not respond to PIAB’s notice and was deemed to have consented to an assessment. PIAB later authorised proceedings and closed its file. The notice party did not issue proceedings under that authorisation. He then made a second application, received by PIAB on 5 October 2011, using the name Moro Issak, also known as Michael Chapwanya. It concerned the same alleged accident and injury and named NR and Keelings Ltd, with Tesco added as a respondent.
PIAB issued a second authorisation on 25 July 2013, using the same reference number as the first. The notice party issued a personal injury summons five days later against Keelings (Distribution) Limited, NR and Tesco Ireland Limited. NR sought judicial review, arguing that PIAB had no power to issue a second authorisation against it after the first had issued. The High Court granted relief and ordered costs against PIAB and the notice party; the notice party appealed.
The Court of Appeal concluded that, under the statutory scheme, PIAB could not issue a later authorisation for the same applicant and injury once it had issued an earlier one, except where another provision of the Act permitted it. The judgment said the notice party had been entitled to commence proceedings under the first authorisation but had not done so within the applicable time limits. The court rejected his argument that invalidating the second authorisation would deny access to justice.
The court held that the second authorisation was unlawful only insofar as it authorised proceedings against NR. It dismissed the appeal. The judgment did not determine the underlying injury claim or make a finding about liability for the alleged accident.