The High Court granted a Georgian national leave to challenge a deportation order after finding substantial grounds to question whether he had been properly notified of the proposal that preceded it. The court also extended the time for bringing the proceedings.
The judgment concerned an application for leave to seek judicial review of a deportation order made in July 2010. The applicant’s sole proposed ground was that there was no evidence he had been properly served with the fresh proposal to deport, dated 12 May 2010, while he was serving a prison sentence at Cloverhill Prison.
The Minister had sent the proposal to Cloverhill and to Refugee Legal Services, which had been the applicant’s last known legal advisers. The service returned the letter the next day, saying it was no longer authorised to act for him. A prison officer’s affidavit referred to a delivery docket and a copy of the letter on the applicant’s prison file. The applicant said he never received it; the court said this evidence might make receipt probable but did not prove personal delivery.
The judge held that the law’s personal-service provision required proof that the letter was delivered to the applicant in person. The alternative postal provision did not assist the Minister: the letter had not been sent to the last address the applicant was found to have furnished, nor to a later address at which the Minister had corresponded with him. The court also found no evidence that Refugee Legal Services had been designated as an address for service, and said its reply should have put the Minister on notice that it could no longer be treated as one.
The court said compliance with the statutory notice requirements was integral to the deportation process and that the failure could not be treated as trivial on the evidence before it. This was a leave-stage decision, not a final ruling quashing the order: the judge concluded that the applicant had established substantial grounds to challenge its validity.
The applicant received notice of the order on 16 August 2010 and proceedings began on 2 December. The judge accepted that he had moved as quickly as reasonably possible and inferred from his prompt efforts to obtain advice and challenge the order that he had formed the required intention to bring proceedings within 14 days. The court ordered an extension of time.