The Supreme Court has quashed decisions refusing primary medical certificates to two disabled children who sought access to vehicle tax concessions, ruling that the criteria had been applied in a way that failed to vindicate their rights under the Finance Act 1989.
In a judgment delivered on 18 June 2020, Ms Justice Iseult O’Malley allowed appeals brought by Alyssa Reeves and George Lennon, each a minor represented by a parent. The Court declared that, in applying Regulation 3 of the Disabled Drivers and Disabled Passengers (Tax Concessions) Regulations 1994 to the children, the respondents failed to vindicate their rights under section 92 of the Act.
The families had sought primary medical certificates for the scheme, which can provide tax repayments and remissions for qualifying vehicles. The Disabled Drivers Medical Board of Appeal refused both appeals, finding that the children did not meet the regulation’s medical criteria. It was agreed that both children were severely and permanently disabled.
The judgment described Alyssa as able to walk short distances only with specialised equipment, and George as having limited mobility, being prone to falls and using a wheelchair much of the time. Their families sought vehicles adapted to meet their needs. The Board’s refusal letters did not explain how it assessed the children’s mobility. The Court noted that a medical letter in George’s case referred to the Hauser Ambulation Index, but said there was no evidence that the Board had used it.
The respondents argued that the Act allowed the Minister for Finance to choose a narrower group of disabled people eligible for the concessions. The Court rejected that interpretation. It held that any further medical criteria had to be necessary to implement the scheme’s purpose: facilitating transport for severely and permanently disabled people where vehicle construction or adaptation was essential for drivers or rationally justified for passengers. The Act did not authorise excluding people whose severe disability created a need for an adapted vehicle because of the particular form or cause of their condition.
The Court also found that the lack of an explanation for the Board’s decisions could itself be sufficient to dispose of the appeals. It observed that the regulations’ criteria appeared focused on drivers and might not address passenger needs such as access to a vehicle or space for a wheelchair and specialised equipment.
The Court did not declare Regulation 3 invalid. It described the problem as the regulation’s under-inclusive nature and quashed the Board’s refusals. The judgment did not itself issue medical certificates or determine what further steps the Board must take.