The High Court dismissed a woman’s personal injuries claim concerning the adoption of her son, finding that the proceedings were brought outside the limitation period. The court also said it would have dismissed the claim because the delay was inordinate and inexcusable and the first defendant could no longer fairly defend it.
The judgment, delivered by Kearns P. on 13 February 2015, concerned an application by the first defendant to dismiss the proceedings for want of prosecution and as statute barred. The court stressed that it was not deciding the merits or truth of the plaintiff’s underlying allegations.
The plaintiff said she became pregnant after being raped by an unknown person while in the care of an institution at High Park, Drumcondra, in 1968. She alleged she was sent to St. Patrick’s, a home on the Navan Road, where she gave birth in March 1969. She claimed she was separated from her son, pressured to sign adoption papers and not given an opportunity to say goodbye when he was taken away. The first defendant disputed responsibility for arranging adoptions and said it acted at St. Patrick’s as an employee of the health authority.
The dispute over timing centred on two consent documents. The plaintiff relied on an interim consent form she signed in May 1969, about two months after the birth, and argued that an informal process had been used to bridge the statutory requirement that consent be given only after a child reached six months. The first defendant relied on a formal consent dated October 1969.
The judge found that an informal process operated in this case and that the first defendant was an active participant. However, the court found that the plaintiff, who was an adult at the time, knew the matters she complained of, including the alleged undue influence and duress. It found no fraud or fraudulent concealment that would postpone the limitation period under section 71 of the Statute of Limitations 1957. The judge also said the documents and details could have been discovered with reasonable diligence before they were obtained from TULSA on 13 November 2014.
The claim had been commenced about 44 years after the events, and the court held it was statute barred. It separately found the delay in commencing proceedings was inordinate and inexcusable. Given the passage of time, the death of potential witnesses and the limited recollection of another, the judge said the balance of justice would also have required dismissal. The order dismissed the plaintiff’s claim.