The High Court has allowed Sandy Lane Hotel Co. Limited to replace Sandy Lane Hotel Limited as plaintiff in a libel action against Times Newspapers Limited and journalists Zoe Brennan and Wendy Leigh. The court found that the original company had been named through a bona fide mistake and that the change was needed to determine the real dispute.
The ruling, delivered by Kearns P. on 10 December 2010, concerns an action over an article published in the Sunday Times on 1 March 1998. The judgment describes Sandy Lane Hotel Limited as a St. Lucia holding company and Sandy Lane Hotel Co. Limited as its wholly owned subsidiary, which owned and operated the Sandy Lane Hotel business in Barbados.
The action began in 1998. After discovery, the plaintiff sought to correct its name in 2005 under a different court rule. The High Court granted that request, but the Supreme Court overturned it in November 2009. The present application was then made under Order 15, rule 2 of the Rules of the Superior Courts.
The defendants opposed substitution. They argued that the two companies were separate legal entities, that the evidence did not establish the kind of bona fide mistake required by the rule, and that the proposed plaintiff’s claim was barred by the Statute of Limitations. They also asked the court to refuse the change because of delay. The plaintiff argued that the mistake concerned the intended company’s name or identity, that the defendants had been on notice of the case, and that the underlying libel claim would remain the same.
Kearns P. concluded that the wrong company had been named by bona fide mistake, substitution was necessary to determine the real matter in dispute, and the underlying cause of action remained unchanged. The defendants had been properly served and had full notice of the case, the judge found, so substitution would cause them no prejudice or injustice.
The court declined to refuse the application on the ground that the claim was clearly time-barred and futile. It did not determine the limitation issue itself. The order permitted the amendment under Order 15, rule 2, which the judgment distinguished from the separate rule for adding parties. The ruling addressed who could pursue the existing action; it did not decide the libel claim or its merits.