The Supreme Court has set aside a default judgment against the State defendants in a case alleging unlawful arrest, false imprisonment and other misconduct by Garda members. It allowed the defendants to file a defence, on condition that they pay the plaintiff’s costs up to the date of trial. The ruling did not decide whether the alleged events occurred or whether the defendants are liable.
The appeal concerned an interlocutory order. The High Court had refused the defendants’ application to set aside a judgment entered in default of defence. In a judgment delivered on 28 July 2011, Murray J. allowed the appeal under Order 27, Rule 14(2) of the Rules of the Superior Courts.
The plaintiff’s claim relates to events he alleged took place on 8 April 2003. His statement of claim said Garda members arrested him at his workplace, took him to a multi-storey car park and then to his home, which they entered, before bringing him to a Garda station in Castlebar. He alleged that a Garda member put a gun to his head, that he was handcuffed and repeatedly pressured for information, and that he was unlawfully detained for about two and a half hours. He also claimed injury and damage to his reputation and credit. These are allegations in the underlying proceedings, not findings made in this appeal.
The default followed a procedural misunderstanding. The parties had agreed that a motion for judgment in default would be struck out and the defendants given three weeks to file a defence. Instead, the motion was adjourned for three weeks. The defendants’ solicitor did not know it had been adjourned, and the plaintiff’s solicitor later wrote that it had been struck out. When the defendants did not attend the relisted motion, the High Court made an “unless” order on 12 March 2007: judgment would be entered unless a defence was delivered by 21 March. No defence was filed by that deadline.
Murray J. found that the solicitor’s lack of awareness, together with the mistaken letter, amounted to “special circumstances” explaining the default under the amended rule. That finding did not automatically entitle the defendants to relief. The court also weighed their admitted, inordinate delay against the defendants’ stated wish to defend the claim and the absence of evidence that a fair trial on the merits would be prejudiced.
The court concluded that liability could be heard alongside the damages assessment already set down for trial, without further delay caused by allowing a defence. It therefore set aside the default judgment and granted liberty to file a defence, subject to the costs condition. The underlying claim remained to be determined.