The Supreme Court ruled that Gardaí did not have to follow the procedure in section 30(3A) of the Offences Against the State Act 1939 to question M.C. about another suspected offence, provided the suspicion that had justified his original arrest remained bona fide held.
The judgment, delivered by Mr Justice Clarke on 9 April 2014, answered a question of law referred by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). The Court held that the Special Criminal Court had been incorrect in its construction of the provision. The reference was made without prejudice to M.C.’s acquittal, which the Supreme Court expressly left undisturbed.
M.C. had been arrested on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation. A search of his home on 11 September 2010 began while he was absent and continued after he returned. An electrical grinder and ammonium nitrate were found in a shed beside the house. During detention, questioning shifted to the explosives, and M.C. later admitted responsibility for the items. He was tried only for unlawful possession of explosives.
The Special Criminal Court found that his continued detention became unlawful when questioning shifted to explosives because the procedure under section 30(3A) had not been followed. It ruled his subsequent admission inadmissible and acquitted him. The DPP’s reference asked whether that court had interpreted section 30(3A) correctly; it did not ask the Supreme Court to overturn the acquittal.
The Supreme Court said the provision permits continued detention for an “other offence” when specified Garda officers have reasonable grounds to believe detention is necessary for its proper investigation. It is not a mandatory procedure for every instance of questioning about another offence. The Court interpreted it as applying when suspicion of the original offence has disappeared, so that detention would otherwise have to end, but the statutory conditions for continued detention on the other offence are met.
Where the original suspicion remains bona fide, the judgment said, questioning about another potential offence does not by itself make detention unlawful. Whether the original suspicion genuinely continued, and whether questioning focused solely on another offence might show that it had ended, are matters for the trial court to assess on the evidence.
The Court’s answer concerned the interpretation of section 30(3A): the Special Criminal Court was incorrect. Because the reference was without prejudice to the acquittal, the Supreme Court’s ruling did not reverse M.C.’s acquittal.