The High Court has quashed an order remanding Joseph Boyle in custody after finding that the warrant did not identify the legal basis for his detention.
In a judgment delivered on 3 March 2021, Ms Justice Niamh Hyland ruled that s.99 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 gave no express, implied or ancillary power to remand someone pending a hearing on whether to revoke a suspended sentence for an alleged breach of conditions. The case concerned a remand made after Boyle was brought before the Circuit Court on a bench warrant.
The judge nevertheless found that the Circuit Court had an inherent power to remand a person where necessary to ensure attendance at a revocation hearing, provided the power was exercised proportionally. She said the circumstances included the need to have the hearing before the judge who imposed the original sentence, time to obtain legal advice, or the unavailability of a necessary witness.
Boyle had been sentenced in 2016 to four years’ imprisonment, with the final 12 months suspended subject to conditions including probation supervision. After a probation officer sought a revocation hearing, Boyle failed to attend court dates and bench warrants were issued. When a warrant was executed on 17 October 2019, the matter was adjourned until 21 October so it could be heard by the judge with seisin of the case and the probation officer could attend. Boyle was remanded in custody for that period, which included a weekend.
The judge considered that remand proportionate in the circumstances. However, the warrant stated only that the matter was adjourned for a s.99 re-entry and that Boyle had been remanded in custody. It did not say that the remand relied on the court’s inherent jurisdiction. Because s.99 contains a separate remand power for a different situation, the reference to s.99 did not make the legal basis clear to a person in custody, prison governor or reviewing court.
The court held that the warrant was defective on its face and quashed the 17 October 2019 remand order. It found that the period of remand was ascertainable from the warrant’s date and the listed return date. The judge said she would hear counsel on whether any further orders were required. The judgment’s final paragraph refers to the order as dated 17 December 2019, although its earlier account and the relief identify 17 October 2019.