The High Court has refused Shane Egan’s application for release from an extradition order, finding that the alleged conduct in a UK warrant corresponded to conspiracy to defraud under Irish law.
Mr Justice Michael Peart delivered the judgment on 13 December 2005. Egan had been ordered surrendered to UK authorities by a District Court judge on 30 July 2001. He then applied under section 50 of the Extradition Act 1965, arguing both that the passage of time made surrender unjust and that the alleged offence did not correspond to a sufficiently serious offence in Ireland.
The alleged UK offence was that Egan conspired with another person between 18 December 1996 and 22 January 1999 to dishonestly obtain money transfers from the Department for Education and Employment by deception. The warrant specified an alleged false representation that certain organisations would provide training for service industries.
On delay, the High Court assessed the period from the earliest alleged offence date in December 1996 to the issuing of Egan’s High Court summons on 30 July 2001. It said the later, substantial delay while the application proceeded through the court system could not count towards the statutory test. The judge criticised the length of those proceedings as unacceptable in an extradition case, but found the period relevant to the statutory claim was not exceptional. The judgment noted evidence that Egan had been living in Luxembourg when the warrant reached Ireland and that he was arrested after returning in December 2000. The delay ground therefore failed.
On correspondence, the judge rejected the District Court’s earlier view that the alleged conduct amounted to conspiring to obtain money by false pretences. The alleged representation concerned future conduct, which the judgment said could not form a false pretence for that offence. However, the High Court considered the separate offence of conspiracy to defraud at common law. It found that the warrant alleged a dishonest agreement to obtain money and that the specified means did not prevent the alleged conduct from amounting to that offence if proved.
The court was required to make its own determination on correspondence despite the District Court’s earlier decision. It found the alleged acts would have constituted conspiracy to defraud in Ireland on the relevant date, and refused the relief sought under section 50. The judgment determined the extradition application; it did not decide whether Egan was guilty of the alleged conduct.