The Supreme Court prohibited any further step in the prosecution of P.D., finding that prosecutorial delay and the absence of a psychologist who had treated the complainant created a significant risk of an unfair trial. The judgment did not determine whether the allegations were true or whether P.D. was guilty.
The complainant alleged six counts of buggery and eight of indecent assault, said to have occurred between June 1982 and April 1983. He said he was a child in law at the time. P.D. denied the allegations. He was arrested in December 1998 and charged in October 1999.
The court focused on the loss of evidence that might have helped test the complainant’s account. The psychologist, Ms Claire Moran, had treated the complainant and was involved in the circumstances leading to his report to gardaí. The judgment said her evidence was highly relevant to when and how the allegations against P.D. emerged. A second psychologist was also unavailable. The judgment noted that records from a clinic and P.D.’s business documents had been destroyed in fires, and said it could see no reliable “island of fact” in the case as it then stood.
The court considered therapy notes and letters described in the judgment, including a note that the complainant felt “manipulated into court” and records of earlier disclosures that did not name P.D. It said the absence of Ms Moran meant the circumstances and detail of the eventual allegation could not be properly established. The court also noted that the complainant had first approached gardaí in February 1996, made a formal statement in June 1996, and that P.D. was charged more than three years later. It found the delay in charging had not been adequately explained.
The judgment acknowledged that Detective Garda O’Brien worked continuously and assiduously after taking over the investigation. It nevertheless concluded that the investigation had not materially developed the case against P.D. during the period before he was charged, and that an important witness became unavailable during that time.
Applying the test of whether there was a real risk that a fair trial could not be obtained, the Supreme Court held that the case had passed beyond the point where it could be fairly litigated. It allowed no further prosecutorial step. The ruling concerned the fairness of proceeding after delay and missing evidence; it was not a trial or a finding on the complainant’s allegations.