The Court of Appeal has refused an appellant’s application to add three grounds to his appeal against conviction and dismissed the appeal. The application concerned the trial judge’s directions to the jury on the presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt and the treatment of lies told in Garda interviews.
The judgment, delivered by Ms Justice Kennedy on 24 April 2020, records that C.M. pleaded guilty to assault causing harm and not guilty to rape. A Central Criminal Court jury found him guilty of rape in December 2017. He appealed against conviction.
The appellant originally filed 83 grounds of appeal. In a motion filed in February 2020, his new legal team sought to substitute three grounds, arguing that the trial judge had confused the civil and criminal standards of proof, failed to explain the benefit of the doubt using the “two views” principle, and misstated the effect of lies under the Lucas warning.
The Court of Appeal considered each proposed ground in deciding whether to permit it to be added. It noted that the issues had not been raised in the original appeal grounds and, with the exception of other matters, had not been the subject of requisitions at trial. The court said no explanation had been offered for failing to raise the issues earlier and assessed whether refusing leave would risk injustice.
On the first ground, the court found that the trial judge’s recharge clearly explained the presumption of innocence and that the charge as a whole repeatedly set out the prosecution’s burden and the criminal standard of proof. It concluded that the word “probability” had been used as part of an example about making an important personal decision, not to define the criminal standard.
On the benefit-of-the-doubt ground, the court acknowledged that the jury had not received the specific direction described in *The People (AG) v Byrne* about choosing the view favourable to the accused where two views were possible. It nevertheless found that the judge had repeatedly explained the reasonable-doubt standard and the appellant’s entitlement to the benefit of the doubt. The court was not persuaded to allow that ground to be litigated.
On the Lucas warning, the court considered the full charge, including the judge’s cautions that people may lie for reasons other than guilt and that the jury should be hesitant to attach significant weight to the interview remarks. It found the charge favoured the appellant and that refusing leave would not cause a miscarriage of justice.
The court refused leave to add all three grounds, finding no error or oversight of substance and no injustice from refusing the motion. It then dismissed the appeal.