The High Court has refused two judicial review applications seeking to quash convictions under road traffic legislation, despite finding that the charges and related conviction documents were drafted incorrectly.
In a judgment delivered on 13 October 2014, Mr Justice Birmingham considered the cases of Colm Ahearn and John Joyce together because they raised similar issues. Both had pleaded guilty to charges under section 113 of the Road Traffic Act 1961 concerning getting into stationary vehicles. The charges and later documents did not say that this was done “without lawful authority or reasonable cause”, as the provision requires.
Ahearn’s case arose from an incident involving a car at Aspen Park, Kinsealy, on 29 September 2010. He received a €750 fine on the section 113 charge, with 90 days’ imprisonment in default of payment. After the fine remained unpaid, a committal warrant issued. His judicial review challenge concerned the wording of the conviction order and warrant.
Joyce pleaded guilty to two section 113 charges following an incident at Celluplast Limited’s premises at Baldoyle Industrial Estate on 16 October 2011. One charge was taken into account when he received a two-month prison sentence on the other. The judgment says he had served that sentence in full. His challenge concerned the wording of the committal warrant.
The applicants argued that omitting the statutory words was a fundamental error and that the convictions should be quashed as of right. The respondents said the error was minor, caused no prejudice, and was reflected in the charges to which the applicants had pleaded guilty.
Justice Birmingham held that the charges, conviction orders and warrants should have referred to the absence of lawful authority or reasonable cause. But each document cited section 113 and the relevant amendments. In the judge’s view, those references, read with the facts stated, left no doubt about what had been alleged and admitted. He found no error on the face of the record warranting the requested relief, saying no one had been misled or prejudiced.
The judge also considered whether he should quash the convictions if the defects did amount to errors on the record. He said the drafting problems were not fundamental and could be regarded as harmless and insubstantial. Given the applicants’ guilty pleas and the absence of prejudice, he exercised his discretion to refuse relief.
The court therefore declined to quash the challenged instruments. It did not decide the separate argument concerning a rule of court that had been raised in Ahearn’s case, saying that issue had not featured in the hearing.