The High Court has dismissed a historic sexual abuse claim against a school authority and a diocesan bishop because the passage of time had made a fair trial against them impossible. It refused to strike out the claim against the priest accused of the abuse, and declined to decide whether the case was statute-barred without hearing oral evidence.
In a judgment delivered on 9 November 2016, Ms Justice Baker considered a motion by the first defendant to strike out personal injury proceedings for inordinate and inexcusable delay. The second and third defendants supported the motion on distinct grounds. The allegations have not been determined at trial.
The plaintiff alleges that the first defendant, a chaplain at the school he attended in Cork City, sexually assaulted him during the 1964–65 school year, including on an outing to Redbarn beach near Youghal. He says the alleged abuse caused lasting psychological harm. All three defendants deny the claim.
The judge found that the second defendant, the City of Cork Vocational Education Committee, faced concrete and irremediable prejudice. It lacked records from the relevant period, including material that might have shown whether the plaintiff attended the school and how chaplaincy services were arranged. The absence of records also hampered its ability to seek contribution or address liability between the defendants. The judge dismissed the claim against it.
The third defendant, identified in the judgment as the Roman Catholic bishop for Cork and Ross, also faced extreme evidential prejudice. Two former bishops and other clergy who might have had relevant information had died, and there was no documentary or other evidence available about the relationship between the priest and the diocese. The judge dismissed the claim against the third defendant as well.
The first defendant did not meet the stricter test requiring proof of a real risk of an unfair trial. The judge noted he had not said he could not remember the plaintiff or the alleged beach incident. Although the plaintiff’s delay in bringing and pursuing the case was inordinate and not fully excused, the judge also considered the plaintiff’s health and the first defendant’s own delay in bringing the strike-out motion. Weighing the parties’ interests, she refused to strike out the claim against the first defendant, which must proceed to trial.
The first defendant also argued that the claim was statute-barred. The plaintiff relied on alleged psychological disability under the Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act 2000 and submitted medical evidence. The judge declined to decide the issue on the motion, holding that it would be wrong to rule without hearing the plaintiff and relevant medical witnesses.