The High Court has refused an application to stop the prosecution of G.C. on 16 counts of alleged indecent assault involving two nieces, identified as Y.M. and R.M. The court found that the delay was inordinate, but concluded that it was not enough to make a fair trial impossible.
Mr Justice Clarke delivered the judgment on 16 February 2006 in judicial review proceedings against the Director of Public Prosecutions. G.C. sought an order prohibiting the trial, relying on delays in the complaints, the prosecution process and the overall passage of time.
The alleged offences were said to have occurred between September 1979 and January 1985. The judgment records that Y.M. made a formal complaint in April 2001 and R.M. in March 2001, between 16 and 22 years after the alleged offences. G.C. was charged in May 2001 and sent forward for trial in July 2003.
The court considered psychological evidence from clinical psychologist Ruth Yoder, who assessed both complainants and was cross-examined. The judge accepted her evidence that the complainants’ relationship with their uncle involved dominance and that psychological inhibition had contributed to their delays in reporting. The judgment treated the alleged offences as true only for the limited purpose of assessing the explanations for delay; it did not determine whether the allegations were true.
On prejudice, the court found no specific prejudice established from the deaths of two people who might have been relevant witnesses. The complainants’ evidence that the alleged incidents occurred when they were alone with G.C. was uncontested in the application. The judge did find significant general or presumptive prejudice from the passage of time.
The court also rejected the claim of prosecutorial delay. It found that Garda enquiries had proceeded with appropriate expedition and that the time taken by the Director to consider the complex file, seek senior counsel’s opinion and request further information about Y.M.’s complaint was not excessive. The judge held that delay per se was not a separate ground for stopping the trial.
Having found that the general prejudice did not establish that a fair trial could not occur, the court refused the order sought. The judgment concerned the application to halt the prosecution; it did not decide the criminal charges.