Judgment: 2013-07-03 · Court archive

High Court lifts proceeds order over company account after finding CAB failed in disclosure duty

The court said the original application against the anonymised company was based on alleged fuel laundering, while the Bureau’s later response relied on money laundering.

The High Court · [2013] IEHC 302

Who, what, where, when and why

Who
  • Criminal Assets Bureau (Applicant)
  • Kevin Cross (Judge)
What

The court said the original application against the anonymised company was based on alleged fuel laundering, while the Bureau’s later response relied on money laundering.

Where

Places mentioned in the report

  • Bank of Ireland
When

Judgment:

Why

Reasons reported in the judgment

The High Court has lifted a proceeds of crime order over a bank account held by an anonymised company after finding that the Criminal Assets Bureau failed to disclose material information when it sought the order without notice to the company.

The High Court has lifted a proceeds of crime order over a bank account held by an anonymised company after finding that the Criminal Assets Bureau failed to disclose material information when it sought the order without notice to the company.

In a judgment delivered on 3 July 2013, Mr Justice Kevin Cross ruled that the Bureau’s original application under section 2 of the Proceeds of Crime Act was based on an allegation that the company was connected to a fuel-laundering scheme. He found that the Bureau’s case in response to the company’s challenge had shifted to alleged money laundering, and that this was not the case presented when the order was first sought.

The original order, made on 26 April 2013, prevented the 21st named respondent from dealing with about €292,731 in a Bank of Ireland account. The company asked the court to discharge the order insofar as it affected that account, arguing that the Bureau had not told the court about its business records, its cooperation with investigators, or its account that transactions related to legitimate fuel sales.

The Bureau submitted that the company’s cooperation and explanations were not material to its application. It argued that any omissions were marginal and that the order should remain in place, including in light of concerns about the company trading without a mineral oil licence and cash transactions.

The judge rejected the Bureau’s contention that the original application had been based on money laundering. He said the affidavit material pointed instead to the company’s alleged involvement with the K. family in fuel laundering. The court found that the Bureau had not disclosed the company’s explanation that its transactions were legitimate commercial dealings supported by records. It also held that if money laundering had been the basis of the application, the Bureau should have stated that clearly and disclosed the relevant grounds.

The court did not accept every complaint made by the company. It found that the company’s account of ending dealings with another business and its explanation for not holding a licence were not material to the original decision. The judge also noted a concern raised in a replying affidavit about the possible availability of the company’s lodgement book to customers, but said this remained a possibility rather than an established fact and had not formed part of the original application.

The court granted the company’s application to lift the section 2 order only insofar as it affected that respondent. The judgment did not determine a broader claim about the other respondents or make a finding that the company had committed money laundering.

Read the original court judgment

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