The High Court has refused an application to quash an order restricting media reporting of a criminal case, holding that a statutory anonymity ban remained in force regardless of the trial’s outcome.
In a judgment delivered on 9 December 2008, Mr Justice Hanna said section 3(1) of the Criminal Law (Incest Proceedings) Act 1995 prohibited publication of material likely to identify a person charged with incest or the person in relation to whom the offence was alleged. The ban had no exception following conviction and was not subject to a time limit, he said.
The criminal case involved seven charges: five of indecent assault and two of incest. The notice party pleaded guilty to one indecent assault count and was found guilty on another. The jury disagreed on three further indecent assault charges, on which the State entered a nolle prosequi, and acquitted him on both incest charges. He received a suspended 12-month sentence and was placed on the Sex Offenders Register. The judgment identifies the applicant as the victim of the sexual assault and the notice party as her older brother; their names are withheld here.
After sentencing, the trial judge referred to the statutory anonymity provisions. The High Court judgment records that the parties agreed a later order stating there should be “No Reporting of this Case by the Media” most closely represented what had occurred, although two different versions of the order had surfaced. The judge’s words in the transcript, Hanna said, reminded the press of their legal obligations and did not appear to impose the broader prohibition stated in the perfected order.
The applicant sought judicial review of the order and an extension of time to bring the application. She argued the statute did not create a blanket ban once the incest charges had ended in acquittal. The notice party and, initially, the respondents opposed the application. Hanna ruled that the Director of Public Prosecutions was bound by an earlier fax withdrawing opposition, though the notice party continued to oppose the relief.
Hanna said the statute itself governed publication and that quashing the trial judge’s order would not change the parties’ protection. He therefore declined to quash it. On delay, he said the applicant had pursued the matter through correspondence, a support organisation, solicitors and applications to the trial judge. Had she been entitled to relief, he would have extended the time. As he found she was not entitled to the relief sought, he refused the application.