The High Court found that culpable prosecution delay breached an accused man’s constitutional right to an early trial, but declined to prohibit his trial on four sexual assault charges. Mr Justice Hogan said the prosecution should take immediate steps to secure an early trial. If adequate steps were not taken, the applicant could return to court to seek prohibition.
The judgment, delivered on 17 October 2012, concerned G.C., who had been returned for trial on four charges under section 2 of the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990. The prosecution alleged that, on dates unknown between June and August 1996, he indecently assaulted four girls aged 11 to 13. The allegations were not findings of guilt. The judgment said the complainants had made detailed statements at the time and were available to give evidence.
G.C. was arrested and questioned in September 1996. He left for the United States the following month, then returned permanently to Ireland in 2005. The Director of Public Prosecutions had directed prosecution in June 1997, but the Gardaí did not act on those directions because they believed he had left the jurisdiction. After a complainant asked about the case in February 2011, further inquiries located him in December that year. He was arrested and charged in February 2012, then returned for trial in Cork Circuit Court and admitted to bail subject to surrendering his travel documents.
The judge accepted that G.C.’s departure complicated the prosecution’s work and that he had contributed to the delay. But he concluded that authorities had failed to follow up leads that could have helped locate him, including inquiries with his parents and US authorities. The judgment also noted that the Garda vetting system had not disclosed the outstanding charges when G.C. applied for professional registration after returning to Ireland.
The court held that the delay—about 16 years from the complaints to the judgment—was inordinate and blameworthy and violated the early-trial guarantee in Article 38.1 of the Constitution. However, G.C. had disclaimed specific prejudice from the delay, and the judge considered that the breach could initially be addressed without stopping the prosecution. He expected the case to be brought promptly before the appropriate Circuit Court judge to seek an immediate trial date, which he said should be secured within a few months at most.
The court therefore did not grant the requested order prohibiting the trial. The judgment left G.C. able to apply again for prohibition if adequate steps toward an early trial were not taken. It also said he could be given permission to amend his pleadings to seek damages for the constitutional breach.