The High Court has refused an application by Ann Farrell to dismiss proceedings against her and Johnny Patrick Michael Farrell under the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, finding that the delay was neither inordinate nor inexcusable.
Mr Justice Feeney delivered the judgment on 11 October 2007. The application sought dismissal for want of prosecution, arguing that the plaintiff had not advanced the case and that the passage of time made it harder for Farrell to defend it. She also cited an interim property restraint and proceedings reaching back to the 1970s.
The court reviewed the procedural history from the case’s commencement in July 2000. It found that much of the elapsed time was taken up by complex preliminary legal and constitutional applications brought by both defendants, including appeals to the Supreme Court. The judge said those matters had to be resolved before the case could proceed to a full hearing. He identified the wait of more than 12 months for a Supreme Court hearing as the main significant period of delay outside those applications, but found it understandable given the issues and the need for a larger court.
Farrell’s application also relied on delays in discovery. The court said the plaintiff sought discovery after Farrell delivered her defence in March 2006, and a consent order set an eight-week period. The discovery affidavit was served about four weeks beyond that period. The judge found that delay did not justify dismissing the proceedings. He also noted that Farrell’s defence came nearly four years after the statement of claim, in the context of the preliminary applications she had pursued.
The judge said Farrell had not identified actual prejudice or shown a substantial risk that a fair trial would be impossible. He rejected the suggestion that the State’s drafting of the 1996 Act made the resulting litigation systemic delay attributable to public authorities. The court also found the property restraint did not alter its conclusion, noting that the Act allowed applications to vary or amend orders.
The court held that Farrell had not established inordinate or inexcusable delay. It added that, even if such delay had been shown, the balance of justice favoured allowing the case to continue. The ruling dismissed Farrell’s application only; it did not determine the underlying proceeds-of-crime claim, which remained for later proceedings.