The High Court dismissed a Permanent Defence Forces member’s negligence claim arising from a mortar attack at an Irish post in Lebanon in 1999, finding that the defendants were not negligent in assessing the risk, providing accommodation or responding to his psychological injuries.
In a judgment delivered on 18 April 2008, Ms Justice Irvine considered claims by Darren Clarke against the Minister for Defence, Ireland and the Attorney General. Clarke was wounded by shrapnel when a mortar landed inside post 6-42 on 31 May 1999. Private Kedian was killed and Private Rushe was seriously injured. The court said the shrapnel that wounded Clarke had penetrated the walls of his billet.
Clarke alleged that the defendants failed to sound the “Groundhog” alarm in time, adequately assess risks to troops, reinforce billets against mortar fire, and provide sufficient psychological monitoring and care. The defendants’ evidence was that the mortar attack was unannounced and unprecedented at an Irish post, and that troop safety and local risks were regularly reviewed.
The court found the defendants’ assessment of the risk of an unannounced mortar attack at post 6-42 reasonable. It said the evidence did not establish negligence in failing to add measures such as sandbags, T-walls or reinforced accommodation. Those measures would have offered limited additional protection, the court found, and the post’s perimeter was adequately protected against direct fire.
On the alarm claim, the court considered machine-gun fire from Whiskey 144 shortly before the attack. Commanders assessed it as weapons testing rather than a threat to the post and did not sound Groundhog at that point. The court held that the order allowed commanders to use their judgment and that their decision followed a careful assessment. Even if the order had not been followed to its strict wording, the court found no negligence. Groundhog was sounded after the later attack began, but the second mortar landed while troops were responding.
The defendants accepted that Clarke developed PTSD and that an earlier diagnosis would probably have led to an earlier recovery and less suffering. The court nevertheless found that the Defence Forces’ critical incident support and monitoring were consistent with the standards of the time and that the claim of negligent psychological care was not established. It also found insufficient evidence to conclude that care after a February 2000 psychiatric assessment was negligent.
The court concluded that Clarke’s injuries did not arise from negligence by the defendants. The judgment dismissed his claim; it did not award damages.