The High Court dismissed William Jones’s action against Coolmore Stud over a letter its solicitors sent to an English book distributor, finding that the claim was frivolous and vexatious.
Mr Justice Allen ruled on an application by Coolmore to strike out the claim or dismiss it under the court’s inherent jurisdiction. He concluded that earlier High Court and Court of Appeal decisions had settled the defendant’s entitlement in principle to send distributors letters raising concerns about Jones’s book, *The Black Horse Inside Coolmore*.
The action concerned a letter dated 30 November 2017 to Gardners Books Ltd, which was sent by post to its Eastbourne address and to three company email accounts. The letter said the book was defamatory of Coolmore, its employees and associated people; alleged breaches of intellectual property, privacy and confidentiality rights; and raised alleged copyright infringement involving third parties. It asked Gardners to remove the book from sale and warned that continued sales could expose it to liability. The judgment records that Gardners withdrew the book after receiving the letter.
Jones argued that the earlier proceedings concerned only an application for an injunction, while his new action sought damages for defamation over a later letter. He also argued that the letter’s reference to Irish defamation law implied a threat against UK booksellers, and that the book could not be defamatory without a court ruling to that effect. He alleged that the letter was maliciously intended to mislead UK booksellers and harm him.
Allen J held that the earlier litigation had finally determined that Coolmore could communicate its concerns to distributors in defence of its rights. Although the 2017 letter post-dated those proceedings, Jones’s challenge to Coolmore’s entitlement to send such letters attempted to reopen an issue already decided. The judge also found that the new arguments about possible defences available to distributors did not make the letter actionable.
The judge considered the separate allegation of malice in relation to the 2017 letter. He found that the matters Jones relied on—including the letter’s purpose of having the book withdrawn and the fact that it was withdrawn—did not amount to malice in law. The court accepted that the correspondence was intended to stop distribution, but found its purpose was to protect Coolmore’s reputation. It also found the letter was sent to company addresses and divisions with a legitimate interest in receiving it.
On the uncontested facts, Allen J concluded that the claim was bound to fail in law and that allowing it to proceed would expose Coolmore to the expense of defending it and waste court time. He granted Coolmore’s application to dismiss the action. The judgment does not record a trial of the defamation claim or a finding that the book itself was defamatory.