Judgment: 2001-07-11 · Court archive

Supreme Court judge says Dáil speech should not have been used to interpret health charges law

Supreme Court ·

Who, what, where, when and why

Who
  • Derek Crilly
  • Eastern Health Board
  • FBD Insurance plc
  • Mr Justice Fennelly
  • Ms Justice Denham
What

Supreme Court judge says Dáil speech should not have been used to interpret health charges law

Where

Places mentioned in the report

  • Supreme Court
  • High Court
When

Judgment:

Why

Reasons reported in the judgment

A Supreme Court judge has held that a Dáil speech by the Minister for Health should not have been used to interpret legislation governing health board charges arising from road traffic accident injuries.

A Supreme Court judge has held that a Dáil speech by the Minister for Health should not have been used to interpret legislation governing health board charges arising from road traffic accident injuries.

Mr Justice Fennelly delivered his judgment on 11 July 2001 in proceedings involving Derek Crilly, the Eastern Health Board and FBD Insurance plc. He agreed with Ms Justice Denham on the interpretation of section 2 of the Health (Amendment) Act 1986 and with Denham and Murray JJ that parliamentary debates should not be considered in the case.

The disputed material was a ministerial statement explaining that section 2(1) gave health boards power to charge for hospital services provided to people injured in road accidents who had received, or were entitled to receive, damages or compensation.

In the High Court, Mr Justice Geoghegan had considered part of that statement when addressing the legislation, although he had already reached a clear conclusion on the statutory wording.

Fennelly J reviewed Irish, British and other common-law authorities on whether parliamentary material can assist statutory interpretation. He emphasised the Supreme Court’s earlier statement that courts are concerned with the meaning of legislation actually passed by the Oireachtas and should apply ordinary principles of statutory construction.

The judge also identified a practical consequence of routinely admitting parliamentary debates. Lawyers could feel obliged to investigate legislative debates in most statutory cases, increasing the volume of material placed before courts and adding to legal costs even where the legislation itself was clear.

He stopped short of laying down an absolute rule excluding parliamentary material in every possible case. His conclusion was narrower: where, as here, the statutory provision could be interpreted without difficulty using normal legal principles, the Minister’s statement should not have been considered.

The judgment does not reproduce the separate substantive order proposed by Denham J, with which Fennelly J agreed.

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