The High Court has declined a motion to have a personal injury action arising from a 1995 road crash ruled time-barred, finding that the insurers’ conduct had induced the plaintiff’s solicitors to defer issuing proceedings.
The motion concerned whether Jane Evanson’s claim against Sarah A. McColgan, as personal representative of the late Peter McColgan, was barred under section 9 of the Civil Liability Act 1961, as amended. Justice John MacMenamin delivered judgment on 27 January 2006.
The crash happened on 20 October 1995 on the main Letterkenny to Lifford road. Evanson, who was a passenger in a vehicle that collided with one driven by McColgan, was injured. The statutory two-year period expired on 19 October 1997.
Evanson’s solicitor in Northern Ireland began corresponding with Cornhill, the deceased driver’s insurer, in December 1995. The court accepted evidence that in May 1996 an insurer representative told the solicitor liability would not be disputed and asked him to continue handling the claim directly, without referring it to solicitors in Ireland to issue proceedings, to save costs and pursue an early settlement. The insurer denied making a representation that proceedings should not be issued. The representative who allegedly made the May 1996 statement did not provide an affidavit.
The claim continued through correspondence and negotiations. In June 1997, the insurer agreed the vehicle contents claim at £1,850, and a payment was later made. The plaintiff’s first proceedings, issued in October 1998, named the deceased man as defendant. The current proceedings against his personal representative began in July 2000.
The judge found that the representation and the subsequent course of dealings caused the plaintiff’s solicitor to refrain from issuing proceedings within the two-year period. He concluded that, but for the inducement, proceedings would probably have been issued in time. Although the court found no suggestion of dishonesty or misconduct by participants in the negotiations, it held that relying on the statutory time bar would be unconscionable in the circumstances.
The court therefore declined the relief sought in the defendant’s motion. It did not determine the underlying personal injury claim or make a finding on liability for the crash. The judgment said the same limitation issue arose in a separate action brought by Evanson’s husband, and the parties had agreed that the motion would determine the issue for both cases.