The Supreme Court has dismissed the State’s appeal against a €214,000 High Court damages award to David Keating, after refusing an attempt to reopen the question of liability.
The State’s appeal had been limited to the amount of damages. It later sought permission to amend its appeal and send the case back to the High Court to decide whether the State could be liable for harm linked to the application of legislation later found unconstitutional. The Supreme Court refused that application, finding the State had admitted liability at trial and could not withdraw that position after the High Court had assessed damages.
The case arose from an interim barring order made against Keating in November 1998 under the Domestic Violence Act 1996. The Supreme Court had previously ruled that the relevant provisions were unconstitutional because they did not require an ex parte order to expire after a short period, with its continuation subject to a hearing of both parties. It quashed the District Court order. The Court stressed that the constitutional defect concerned the absence of a time limit, not the District Court’s power to make interim orders without notice.
Keating’s damages claims included loss of housing, arrest and detention after an alleged breach of the order, effects on his relationship with his children, loss of reputation, and psychological suffering. The High Court made awards under seven headings, including €50,000 for loss of reputation and good name and €25,000 for emotional and psychological suffering, bringing the total to €214,000. The State had initially denied liability in its written defence but abandoned that defence at the damages trial, which proceeded as an assessment only.
The Supreme Court said the State had chosen not to contest liability and that allowing a retrial would deprive Keating of the benefit of the High Court’s determination. It described the attempt to reopen the issue as an abuse of court process. The Court also noted that the High Court had not identified the legal basis for liability because the State’s admission had made that unnecessary.
Without that legal basis, the Supreme Court said it could not review the damages in the abstract or determine whether the sums were properly assessed. It therefore dismissed the appeal, without deciding the broader question of when the State may be liable for acts done in good faith under legislation that was later found unconstitutional.