The High Court has ruled that “charitable purposes” under the Valuation Act 2001 do not include the advancement of religion for the purpose of a rates exemption. It answered a question of law referred by the Valuation Tribunal, finding that the Tribunal was incorrect to hold otherwise.
The case concerned Tearfund Ireland Limited, a registered charity that leases office space on the second floor of Ulysses House at 22–24 Foley Street, Dublin. The Tribunal had determined in April 2019 that the premises were exempt from rates under paragraph 16(a) of Schedule IV to the 2001 Act. The Commissioner of Valuation asked the High Court to decide whether that interpretation was correct.
Tearfund’s stated objects include relieving poverty and promoting Christian education and evangelism. The office is used for administration, including planning and managing its activities and projects. The parties did not dispute the essential background facts.
The Commissioner argued that Irish rating law had consistently excluded advancement of religion from “charitable purposes” for more than a century, and that the 2001 Act did not clearly change that settled interpretation. Tearfund argued that the Act introduced new exemptions and that the phrase should carry the broader meaning associated with the 1891 House of Lords decision in *Pemsel*, which includes advancement of religion.
Mr Justice Barr said the Oireachtas was presumed to know the established interpretation of the phrase in rating law and would need to use clear terms to make a radical change. He concluded that the Act had not done so. The court also considered the schedule’s separate exemption for buildings used exclusively for public religious worship, and said the wider interpretation Tearfund proposed would extend the exemption substantially.
The judge proposed answering the referred question by stating that the Tribunal was not correct in law: paragraph 16(a) did not include advancement of religion as a charitable purpose for the 2001 Act. The judgment did not set out the final order. Because it was delivered electronically, the parties were given four weeks to provide brief written submissions on the order, costs and any other matters arising.