The High Court has ordered the surrender of Krzysztof Andrzejczak to Poland for prosecution on two alleged offences, after rejecting his objections to the request.
In a judgment delivered on 15 December 2017, Ms Justice Donnelly said the Polish warrant sought his surrender for alleged participation in an organised criminal group and an offence related to facilitating prostitution. The order was made under the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003, after the court found the Act’s requirements had been met.
The respondent argued that the organised-crime offence was extraterritorial because the warrant referred to activity in Denmark, and that surrender was barred without evidence the conduct would also be prosecutable here. The judge rejected that argument. She said the alleged offence was based partly in Poland and, for the purposes of the Act, was to be treated as committed in Ireland as well as another jurisdiction. She also said the additional information linked the alleged participation to activity in Poland.
He also argued that the charges lacked unambiguous clarity because the Polish authority said it could modify the alleged offence periods if his account of leaving Poland permanently in 2007 was verified. He had said he had lived in Cork since 2007. The court held that the response did not change the charges then set out in the warrant or their legal classification. Any verified information and any question about the dates or extent of alleged offending would be for the Polish authorities and trial process. The court found the two offences and their alleged nature clear, and rejected this objection.
The judgment records that an objection based on family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights was not pressed at the hearing. The judge nevertheless considered the respondent’s affidavit, which referred to his partner, two young children, work in Ireland, two employees, and his mother and brother living here. She found the public interest in surrender for prosecution of the serious alleged offences outweighed those private interests, noting no evidence of particular injurious, oppressive or harmful consequences from surrender.
The court was satisfied the person before it was the person named in the warrant, that the warrant had been endorsed for execution, and that no statutory ground required refusal. It ordered surrender to a person authorised by the issuing state to receive him. The judgment concerns surrender for prosecution; it does not determine guilt or innocence.