The Supreme Court has dismissed John Gilligan’s appeal against the constitutionality of a law requiring prison sentences for offences committed while an offender is serving a prison term to run consecutively to the sentence already being served.
In a judgment delivered on 14 October 2013, the Court held that section 13(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1976 did not unlawfully transfer sentencing power from judges to the legislature or executive. The provision requires a sentence of imprisonment, if imposed for an offence committed in prison, to follow the sentence already being served. It does not require a court to impose a custodial sentence or prescribe its length.
Gilligan was serving a 20-year term for drugs-related offences when he assaulted a prison officer. He received a further two-year sentence, to run consecutively. While serving that sentence, he was convicted in the District Court of two offences involving possession of mobile telephones in prison. Those custodial sentences were under appeal to the Circuit Court at the time of the Supreme Court judgment and had been stayed pending the appeal.
Gilligan argued that mandatory consecutivity fettered judicial discretion and breached constitutional protections, including equality before the law and the right to liberty. He also argued that the law treated people serving fixed terms more harshly than people serving life sentences, who are excluded from the provision.
The Court said judges retained responsibility for applying proportionality when sentencing. They could decide whether to impose a fine, a suspended sentence or imprisonment, and could set a just and appropriate sentence in light of the circumstances. The judgment also noted that Gilligan’s original 28-year sentence had been reduced to 20 years on appeal, and that his sentence for assaulting the prison officer had also been reduced on appeal.
On the equality claim, the Court found that people serving life sentences and those serving fixed terms were in objectively different situations. A life sentence endures for the person’s life, so there was a logical basis for treating the two categories differently. The Court also identified deterrence as the provision’s purpose and concluded that the rule was rationally connected to that purpose and was not arbitrary or discriminatory.
The appeal was dismissed. The Court’s ruling addressed the constitutional validity of the consecutive-sentence rule; it did not decide the pending Circuit Court appeals concerning the mobile-phone offences.