The High Court has prohibited disciplinary proceedings against a probationary Garda, finding that an investigating officer’s strongly worded letter had irredeemably tainted the process and could prejudice any future inquiry board.
In a judgment delivered on 26 March 2025, Mr Justice Nolan ruled that the proceedings could not fairly continue before a third board. The court did not determine the underlying disciplinary allegations against the applicant. It found for her on the fair-procedures ground concerning the letter and ordered that the disciplinary process be prohibited.
The applicant had been a probationary member of An Garda Síochána since September 2018. The disciplinary case arose from her investigation of a June 2019 road traffic accident in Shankill, County Dublin. It was alleged that she failed to investigate the accident properly and later altered a Garda computer record about whether the driver had a fully licensed accompanying passenger. Those allegations were not adjudicated in this judicial review.
An investigating officer’s November 2020 letter to the Commissioner described the applicant as untruthful and lacking credibility. The letter went to the first inquiry board, which was later dissolved when a member retired. It was not included in the initial papers for the second board. When it came to light at a hearing in December 2023, the second board stood down, saying it would be unsafe to proceed given the letter’s contents and its earlier non-disclosure.
Justice Nolan said the letter went beyond the formal statement of facts and, in effect, expressed findings of guilt before the board heard evidence. He found that its circulation breached the practice and procedure governing inquiry boards. Because any third board would encounter the letter and know why the second had stood down, the judge concluded the process could not be repaired. He said the case had reached the point where it was clear the process had gone irredeemably wrong.
The applicant had also challenged repeated extensions of her probation, the Minister’s consent to extensions, and delay in the disciplinary process. The court rejected those grounds. It held that the Minister was not required to hear from the applicant before authorising the extensions or to give separate reasons, and accepted the stated reasons as clear and understandable. It also found the delay explained and insufficient to stop the process on its own.
The judgment records that the applicant’s probation had been extended eight times, with the latest extension and ministerial consent dated 15 and 12 April 2024. The court made a provisional view that she should recover her legal costs, subject to further submissions. The case was listed for 10 April 2025 for submissions on the final form of the order and costs.