The Supreme Court has allowed an appeal by the Commissioner of An Garda Síochána in a case about whether a Garda member could face a separate dismissal process after a disciplinary appeal had reduced his sanction.
The judgment, delivered by Mr Justice Brian Murray on 17 July 2025, concerned Raymond Hegarty and the Commissioner. The Court set aside the lower courts’ decisions that had stopped the Commissioner from proceeding under section 14(2) of the Garda Síochána Act 2005. It refused the relief sought by Mr Hegarty.
The case arose from events at Lismore Garda Station on 15 March 2017. In a disciplinary process, Mr Hegarty admitted breaches involving discreditable conduct and neglect of duty. The allegations concerned a sexual act with a woman while he was on duty and a failure to record her statement properly. The Board of Inquiry recommended that he be required to resign as an alternative to dismissal for the first breach, and receive a two-week pay reduction for the second.
The Commissioner initially ordered resignation or dismissal for the first breach and a two-week pay reduction for the second. On appeal, the Appeal Board upheld the findings but replaced the first sanction with a four-week pay reduction, which was the maximum permitted. It left the second sanction in place.
The Commissioner later began a section 14 process, stating that Mr Hegarty’s continued membership would undermine public confidence and that dismissal was necessary to maintain it. Mr Hegarty challenged that move. The High Court quashed the decision to invoke the process, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the Commissioner’s appeal. Both courts considered the second process unfair in light of the completed disciplinary proceedings and the Appeal Board’s decision.
The Supreme Court held that the two regimes serve different purposes. The disciplinary regulations provide sanctions for misconduct; section 14(2) is a separate protective power directed at maintaining public confidence. The Court said that the earlier process and its outcome did not automatically bar the Commissioner from invoking section 14, even where the conduct overlaps.
The Court stressed that the power is exceptional and subject to a high threshold. It is not enough that conduct was wrongful or that some members of the public might lose confidence; the Commissioner must be satisfied that dismissal is necessary to maintain public confidence. The Supreme Court expressly did not decide whether the facts in this case meet that threshold.
The Court also held that section 14 decisions remain open to judicial review under ordinary principles. It said there was no general requirement for a disciplinary-board recommendation before the section could be used, and noted that the conduct was admitted in this case. The appeal concerned whether the Commissioner could proceed under the separate statutory power, not a final decision to dismiss Mr Hegarty.