The Supreme Court has dismissed an appeal by P. MCC, who sought to prevent a third trial on a charge of sexual intercourse with a mentally impaired person. The court held that the two earlier trials had not reached a verdict and that their number, even alongside culpable prosecution delay, did not establish that a future trial would be unfair or that a prohibition order was required.
The charge concerns an alleged offence on 1 July 2001. The first trial began in March 2006 but the jury was discharged on its first day after the complainant gave evidence. A second trial began in May 2007 and was stopped on its third day after a notation on a book of photographs handed to the jury was considered prejudicial. Neither trial concluded with a verdict.
P. MCC brought judicial review proceedings seeking to restrain further prosecution. The High Court found excessive culpable delay in at least some periods, but refused prohibition because it was not satisfied that the delay had caused prejudice showing a real and serious risk of an unfair trial. It also considered and rejected arguments under the European Convention on Human Rights.
The appellant argued that the cumulative delay, the impact on his personal and working life, and the prospect of a third trial justified stopping the prosecution. The Supreme Court accepted that excessive culpable delay had occurred and that the balancing test between the accused’s right to an expeditious trial and the public interest in prosecuting serious charges was engaged. It rejected the claim that the total delay automatically entitled him to prohibition, and found no legal error in the High Court’s treatment of the periods of delay or the claimed stress and anxiety.
The judgment said Irish law did not set a fixed limit on the number of trials where proceedings had not ended in acquittal or conviction. A further trial could still be prohibited if a fair trial could not be guaranteed, but the appellant had not established that a third trial would be unfair merely because it would be a third attempt. The court also rejected the Convention argument that prohibition was necessarily the remedy for culpable delay.
The court dismissed the appeal. The order left the prosecution able to proceed; it did not determine the charge or decide the outcome of any future trial.