Judgment: 2001-07-12 · Court archive

Supreme Court says constitutional right to free primary education does not extend into adulthood

Supreme Court ·

Who, what, where, when and why

Who
  • Jamie Sinnott
  • Kathryn Sinnott
  • Minister for Education
  • Ireland
  • Attorney General
  • Mr Justice Fennelly
What

Supreme Court says constitutional right to free primary education does not extend into adulthood

Where

Places mentioned in the report

  • Ireland
  • Supreme Court
When

Judgment:

Why

Reasons reported in the judgment

The Supreme Court has held that the State’s constitutional duty to provide free primary education is owed to children and does not continue after a person reaches adulthood.

The Supreme Court has held that the State’s constitutional duty to provide free primary education is owed to children and does not continue after a person reaches adulthood.

Mr Justice Fennelly reached that conclusion in proceedings brought on behalf of Jamie Sinnott by his mother, Kathryn Sinnott, against the Minister for Education, Ireland and the Attorney General.

He agreed with judgments delivered by Mr Justice Hardiman and Mr Justice Geoghegan that the constitutional obligation under Articles 41 and 42 did not create a continuing right to free primary education for an adult.

The proceedings had concerned Mr Sinnott’s educational needs and an earlier High Court finding that his constitutional rights had been infringed. However, the State did not contest that infringement or appeal the damages awarded to him.

Mr Justice Fennelly therefore said it was unnecessary to decide a separate question about the quality of education the State was constitutionally required to provide to a person in Mr Sinnott’s circumstances. Because the damages award was not under challenge, he described judicial comments on that broader issue as unnecessary to deciding the case.

He also held that there was no continuing breach of Mr Sinnott’s constitutional rights and consequently no need for a declaration governing future educational provision. He agreed that the existing declaration should instead be reformulated.

The State was also not contesting any part of the damages award, including money allocated for Applied Behaviour Analysis. Mr Justice Fennelly said there was therefore no need to determine a separate separation-of-powers issue concerning that provision. He regarded it as part of the damages award rather than an ongoing judicial direction to the State.

On Kathryn Sinnott’s separate claim, Mr Justice Fennelly stated that he agreed with the judgment of the Chief Justice, but the supplied judgment does not set out that reasoning or its precise result.

Read the original court judgment

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