Judgment: 2009-12-02 · Court archive

High Court keeps structural engineers in Roscommon property damage case despite delay challenges

High Court · [2009] IEHC 581

Who, what, where, when and why

Who
  • S. Doyle & Sons Roscommon Limited (Plaintiff)
  • Flemco Supermarket Limited
  • Fortlyster Limited trading as Hugh Griffin Associates
What

High Court keeps structural engineers in Roscommon property damage case despite delay challenges

Where

Places mentioned in the report

  • Main Street
When

Judgment:

Why

Reasons reported in the judgment

The court dealt first with Rhatigan's notice. Although Ms Justice Laffoy questioned why it had taken about a year and a half to obtain expert advice, Griffin had already entered an appearance, sought a statement of claim, delivered a defence and raised particulars before bringing its challenge. The judge held that Griffin had thereby elected to defend the third-party case and had not sought to set it aside promptly enough.

The High Court has allowed third-party proceedings against structural engineers Hugh Griffin Associates to remain in a Roscommon property damage case arising from building works on Main Street.

Ms Justice Laffoy dismissed two applications by the engineering firm, formally Fortlyster Limited trading as Hugh Griffin Associates, which had sought to set aside notices served by Flemco Supermarket Limited and contractor J.J. Rhatigan and Company Limited.

The underlying proceedings concern property owned by S. Doyle & Sons Roscommon Limited. The company alleges that on 19 July 2004 a gable wall between its premises and an adjoining supermarket development was demolished during construction works, causing serious structural damage. Its building, which contained a ground-floor retail unit and apartments above, was allegedly rendered unsafe and evacuated.

Flemco owned the adjoining property, Rhatigan was its contractor and Griffin had been retained as structural engineer and prepared drawings for the development. Both Flemco and Rhatigan later sought contribution or indemnity from Griffin, alleging professional negligence.

Griffin argued that the third-party notices had not been served "as soon as reasonably possible", as required by the Civil Liability Act 1961.

The court dealt first with Rhatigan's notice. Although Ms Justice Laffoy questioned why it had taken about a year and a half to obtain expert advice, Griffin had already entered an appearance, sought a statement of claim, delivered a defence and raised particulars before bringing its challenge. The judge held that Griffin had thereby elected to defend the third-party case and had not sought to set it aside promptly enough.

Flemco's position was different. The court found that its delay, approaching two years by the relevant measure, meant its notice would not ordinarily have been served soon enough.

However, Rhatigan's third-party proceedings against Griffin were already continuing and involved similar issues. Setting aside Flemco's notice could therefore lead to separate proceedings covering much the same dispute. To avoid that multiplication of litigation, the court exercised its discretion to let Flemco's third-party proceedings continue as well.

Both applications to set aside the notices were dismissed.

Read the original court judgment

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